PhD Workshops:

Topic in Economic Theory and Experimental Economics

Duarte Gonçalves
University College London

Part 1: Duarte Gonçalves

Term 1: Monday 9:00-11:00, DH 321.

Stopping, Searching, and Learning

Part 2: Ran Spiegler

Term 2: 14 Jan – 11 Feb 2026. Wednesday 9:00-11:00 (TBC).

Contracting with loss-averse consumers

The use of complexity in contract design

Incentive and information design with misspecified models

Contracting with dynamically inconsistent consumers

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IO: Browsing (and implications for pricing). Regulation with naive consumers.

Macro: Job search.

Finance: Herd behaviour.

Econometrics: Discretionarily stopping data collection & implications on inference.

More: dynamics of strategic interaction (firms pricing, fund managers investing, ...)

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Fun right? Fundamental

For whom? Anyone interested in

- doing theory (micro, macro, metrics) or experimental;
- importing insights from theory to empirical or experimental work.

Term 1 only: Weekly (randomly assigned) paper presentations. Term project.

Go to one or both terms.

Experimental Economics

Part 1: Michael Thaler

Term 1: Tuesday 13:30-15:15 (TBC).

Social motives (altruism, fairness, and efficiency), attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, and intertemporal trade-offs.

Part 2: Duarte Gonçalves

Term 2: Tuesday 9:00-11:00, DH B03 Ricardo LT.

how people actually acquire and use information;

how we can obtain and what we can learn from process data (e.g., time and attention);

what it means when choices appear inattentive or noisy;

how complexity affects decision-making.

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how complexity affects decision-making.

For whom? Anyone interested in

- doing experimental work or theory;
- importing insights from experimental methodologies to field work.

Both term 1 and 2: project presentations.

Go to one or both terms.

Topics in Economic Theory: Term 1

- 1. Stopping and Choosing: Stopping rules and monotone problems. Job Search.
 - Satisficing. Diamond's Paradox.
 - Lecture(s): 29 September, 6 October.
- Searching: Pandora's Problem and Optimal Search. Martingales and etc. Gittins-Jones Index. Pricing with Pandora Consumers. Lecture(s): 13, 20 October.
- 3. Social Learning: Cascades and Herds. Fads.
 - Lecture(s): 27 October.
- 4. Knowing: Knowledge and Common Knowledge. Common Prior Assumption and No-Trade Theorem. Universal Type Space. Learning and Common Learning.
 - Lecture(s): 3, 10 November.
- Learning in Games: Fictitious Play and Best-Response Dynamics. Potential and Supermodular Games. Evolutionary Game Theory. Other Models of Learning in Games: Berk-Nash Equilibrium and Sequential Sampling Equilibrium. Lecture(s): 17, 24 November.
- 6. Project Presentations.
 - Lecture(s): 1, 8 December.

Topics in Economic Theory: Term 1

Workload: Required of everyone.

Paper Presentations: On a weekly basis, every member of the class will be required to work in a group of at most 3 people to prepare a **15 minute** presentation on an assigned paper.

One group will be selected at random to give the presentation at the start of the class.

Project Presentations: Last two lectures are going to be on a new research project related to class materials.

Allowed to work in groups of at most 3 people.

Motivation, model sketch, target results, proof intuition if available/design/data + discussion

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Introductions: name, year, research interests, anything else you'd like to add.

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