Hi, I'm Duarte.

I work on microeconomic theory and behavioral economics, with a special focus on information economics
I am (soon to be) an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics - University College London
I concluded my Ph.D. in economics at Columbia University in 2021

News

I will be presenting

@ XXIX European Workshop on Economic Theory (June 8, 2021, 8h35 London / 3:15am NY)
@ 2021 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (June 12, 2021, 14h00 London / 9:00am NY)
@ Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2021 (June 17, 2021, 14h15 London / 8:15am NY)
@ Games 2020/1 (sometime between July 21-23, 2021)
@ 2021 European Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (sometime between August 23-27, 2021)

Research

Working Papers

Sequential Sampling Equilibrium
Supersedes and extends the game theoretic part of my job market paper Sequential Sampling and Equilibrium
| Draft coming soon

A new equilibrium solution concept where players sequentially sample to resolve strategic uncertainty over their opponents' distribution of actions delivers predictions on the joint distribution of actions, beliefs, and decision times.

Sequential Sampling under Uncertainty
Supersedes and extends the individual decision-making part of my job market paper Sequential Sampling and Equilibrium
| Draft coming soon

Sequential sampling from an unknown distribution leads to monotone comparative statics in the joint distribution of actions and stopping time with respect to action payoffs, the true unknown distribution, and the prior.

The Effect of Incentives on Choices and Beliefs in Games. An Experiment
| with Teresa Esteban-Casanelles; updated November 2020

The level of incentives affects gameplay and beliefs through both choice mistakes and costly attention.

Statistical Mechanism Design: Robust Pricing and Reliable Projections
| with Bruno Furtado; updated August 2020

A mechanism designer with a sample of consumers’ types can conduct valid inference on profit and regret and use our toolkit to compare mechanisms.

Diagonal Games: A Tool for Experiments and Theory
| updated September 2020

Diagonal games are a useful benchmark to study cognitive limitations in strategic settings, both for exploring predictions of theoretical models and for experimental implementations.

Recommenders’ Originals: Integrated Recommender Systems and Vertical Foreclosure
| with Guy Aridor; updated April 2020

The ability of platforms to bias their recommendations can lead to vertical foreclosure, but separating recommendation and production is not always welfare improving.

Unlearning via Retractions
| with Jonathan Libgober and Jack Willis; Draft coming soon

The ability of platforms to bias their recommendations can lead to vertical foreclosure, but separating recommendation and production is not always welfare improving.

Work in Progress

The Dynamics of Conflict
with César Barilla

Endogenous Strategic Uncertainty
with Teresa Esteban-Casanelles and Evan Friedman

Revising Beliefs on Belief Updating
with Arthur Prat-Carrabin