Hi, I'm Duarte.

I work on microeconomic theory and behavioral economics, with a special focus on information economics
I am an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics - University College London
I concluded my Ph.D. in economics at Columbia University in 2021


I will be presenting

@ 2021 European Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (August 25, 2021, 14h30 London / 9:30am NY)


Working Papers

Sequential Sampling Equilibrium
Supersedes and extends the game theoretic part of my job market paper Sequential Sampling and Equilibrium
| Draft coming soon

A new equilibrium solution concept where players sequentially sample to resolve strategic uncertainty over their opponents' distribution of actions delivers predictions on the joint distribution of actions, beliefs, and decision times.

Sequential Sampling under Uncertainty
Supersedes and extends the individual decision-making part of my job market paper Sequential Sampling and Equilibrium
| Draft coming soon

Sequential sampling from an unknown distribution leads to monotone comparative statics in the joint distribution of actions and stopping time with respect to action payoffs, the true unknown distribution, and the prior.

The Effect of Incentives on Choices and Beliefs in Games. An Experiment
| with Teresa Esteban-Casanelles; updated November 2020

The level of incentives affects gameplay and beliefs through both choice mistakes and costly attention.

Statistical Mechanism Design: Robust Pricing and Reliable Projections
| with Bruno Furtado; updated August 2020

A mechanism designer with a sample of consumers’ types can conduct valid inference on profit and regret and use our toolkit to compare mechanisms.

Diagonal Games: A Tool for Experiments and Theory
| updated September 2020

Diagonal games are a useful benchmark to study cognitive limitations in strategic settings, both for exploring predictions of theoretical models and for experimental implementations.

Recommenders’ Originals: The Welfare Effects of the Dual Role of Platforms as Producers and Recommender Systems
| with Guy Aridor; updated August 2021

The ability of platforms to bias their recommendations can lead to vertical foreclosure, but separating recommendation and production is not always welfare improving.

Learning versus Unlearning: An Experiment on Retractions
| with Jonathan Libgober and Jack Willis; June 2021

Subjects do not fully unlearn from retractions of past signals and update less from them than from equivalent new signals.

Work in Progress

The Dynamics of Conflict
with César Barilla

Endogenous Strategic Uncertainty
with Teresa Esteban-Casanelles and Evan Friedman

Revising Beliefs on Belief Updating
with Arthur Prat-Carrabin