I work on microeconomic theory and behavioral economics, with a special focus on information economics I am an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics - University College London I concluded my Ph.D. in economics at Columbia University in 2021
Sequential Sampling Equilibrium Supersedes and extends the game theoretic part of my job market paper Sequential Sampling and Equilibrium | Draft coming soon
A new equilibrium solution concept where players sequentially sample to resolve strategic uncertainty over their opponents' distribution of actions delivers predictions on the joint distribution of actions, beliefs, and decision times.
Sequential Sampling under Uncertainty Supersedes and extends the individual decision-making part of my job market paper Sequential Sampling and Equilibrium | Draft coming soon
Sequential sampling from an unknown distribution leads to monotone comparative statics in the joint distribution of actions and stopping time with respect to action payoffs, the true unknown distribution, and the prior.
Diagonal games are a useful benchmark to study cognitive limitations in strategic settings, both for exploring predictions of theoretical models and for experimental implementations.
The ability of platforms to bias their recommendations can lead to vertical foreclosure, but separating recommendation and production is not always welfare improving.
